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Abstract.	What	is	human	understanding	and	why	should	we	care	about	it?	I	propose	
a	method	of	philosophical	 investigation	called	‘function-first	epistemology’	and	use	
this	method	to	investigate	the	nature	and	value	of	understanding-why.	I	argue	that	
the	concept	of	understanding-why	serves	the	practical	 function	of	 identifying	good	
explainers,	which	is	an	important	role	in	the	general	economy	of	our	concepts.	This	
hypothesis	 sheds	 light	on	a	 variety	of	 issues	 in	 the	epistemology	of	understanding	
including	the	role	of	explanation,	the	relationship	between	understanding-why	and	
knowledge,	and	the	value	of	understanding-why.	I	conclude	that	understanding-why	
is	valuable	and	yet	knowledge	plays	more	important	roles	in	our	epistemic	life.		
	
	
	
The	 heart	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 a	 simple	 idea:	 we	 can	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 nature	 and	 value	 of	
epistemic	 evaluation	 by	 investigating	 what	 epistemic	 concepts	 are	 for.	 I	 call	 this	
methodological	approach	function-first	epistemology.	A	function-first	epistemologist	seeks	to	
explain	the	nature	and	value	of	an	epistemic	concept	(or	practice)	by	reflecting	on	its	function	
or	purposes.		
I	 am	not	 the	 first	 to	 take	 this	 approach.	 In	his	 insightful	 and	original	 book,	Knowledge	
and	the	State	of	Nature,	Edward	Craig	argues	that	our	practice	of	attributing	knowledge	plays	
a	 vital	 role	 in	 human	 cooperation,	 survival,	 and	 flourishing.	 More	 specifically,	 he	 says	 we	
speak	of	 ‘knowing’	 in	order	 to	recommend	good	sources	of	 information	to	members	of	our	
community.	This	practice	is	necessary,	or	at	least	deeply	important,	because	as	information-
dependent	creatures	we	must	often	rely	on	the	testimony	of	others.	Craig	uses	this	approach	
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to	make	headway	on	 the	Gettier	problem,	 the	 intractability	of	 skepticism,	and	 the	value	of	
knowledge.		
I	 find	 this	 view	 highly	 plausible	 and	 many	 scholars	 claim	 we	 can	 derive	 substantial	
epistemological	payoffs	by	adopting	it.1	Instead	of	focusing	on	knowledge,	however,	I	want	to	
investigate	 why	 humans	 think	 and	 speak	 of	 understanding.	 What	 role	 (or	 roles)	 does	 this	
concept	 play	 in	 human	 life?	 What	 needs	 does	 it	 answer	 to?	 I	 intend	 to	 answer	 these	
questions	 and,	 in	 doing	 so,	make	 progress	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 issues	 including	 the	 nature	 and	
value	 of	 understanding,	 the	 role	 of	 explanation	 in	 understanding,	 and	 the	 relationship	
between	 understanding	 and	 knowledge.	 I	will	 also	 highlight	 some	 benefits	 of	 function-first	
epistemology	and	put	this	approach	on	a	sounder	methodological	basis.		
	
1.	Understanding	and	Knowing	
Philosophical	interest	in	understanding	has	expanded	in	recent	years.	Those	familiar	with	
this	 body	 of	 literature	 will	 know	 that	 philosophers	 exploring	 the	 nature	 of	 understanding	
have	 largely	done	so	by	comparison	with	knowledge.	As	a	result	of	comparing	knowing	and	
understanding,	 philosophers	 have	 tended	 to	 concentrate	 on	 answering	 the	 following	
questions:	Is	understanding	factive?	Is	it	immune	to	epistemic	luck?	Is	it	transparent?	Does	it	
come	in	degrees?	Is	it	transmittable	via	testimony?	Is	it	reducible	to	knowledge?	This	cluster	
of	 questions	 has	 largely	 set	 the	 research	 agenda	 for	 the	 study	 of	 understanding	 in	
epistemology.	Philosophers	have	sought	 to	 improve	our	understanding	of	understanding	by	
comparing	it	with	what	we	know	about	knowledge.		
Unsurprisingly,	philosophers	disagree	about	the	answers	to	these	questions.	It	is	widely	
accepted	 that	 knowledge	 is	 factive,	 but	 it	 is	 less	 clear	 whether	 understanding	 is	 factive.2	
While	 pretty	much	 everyone	 thinks	 certain	 types	 of	 epistemic	 luck	 undermine	 knowledge,	
                                                
1	See	Neta	(2006),	Weinberg	(2006),	Fricker	(2008),	Greco	(2008),	Henderson	(2009),	Dogramaci	(2012),	
Pritchard	(2012),	McKenna	(2013),	Grimm	(2015),	and	Hannon	(2017).		
2	Zagzebski	(2001),	Elgin	(2007),	and	Riggs	(2009)	argue	that	understanding	is	not	factive,	while	Pritchard	
(2009),	Strevens	(2013),	Greco	(2014),	and	Hills	(2016)	claim	that	at	least	some	types	of	understanding,	such	
as	understanding-why,	are	factive.		
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there	is	little	agreement	about	whether	understanding	is	immune	to	the	same	forms	of	luck.3	
Almost	 everyone	 agrees	 that	 understanding	 comes	 in	 degrees,	 but	 there	 is	 disagreement	
about	whether	knowledge	admits	of	degrees.4	It	has	also	been	said	that	understanding,	unlike	
knowledge,	 is	 transparent;	 but	 this,	 too,	 is	 disputed. 5 	Finally,	 it	 is	 debatable	 whether	
understanding	 is	 transmittable	 via	 testimony	 and	 yet	 testimony	 is	 a	 basic	 way	 in	 which	
knowledge	gets	around.6		
Interesting	 though	 these	 questions	 may	 be,	 I	 want	 to	 temporarily	 set	 them	 aside	 (I’ll	
return	to	some	of	them	shortly).	These	debates	are	focused	on	getting	the	conditions	under	
which	one	has	understanding	just	right,	 leaving	aside	for	the	most	part	questions	about	the	
role	of	understanding	in	our	lives	more	broadly.	Let	me	explain.		
Suppose,	 however	 optimistically,	 that	 these	 conceptual	 issues	were	 one	 day	 resolved.	
This	would	 certainly	 be	 a	 considerable	 achievement,	 but	 answering	 these	 questions	would	
not	 tell	 us	 why	 our	 epistemic	 concepts	 have	 (or	 lack)	 these	 features.	 For	 example,	 let’s	
assume	that	understanding	turned	out	to	be	non-factive	and	compatible	with	epistemic	luck.	
We	might	 ask:	why	 do	we	 have	 a	 concept	 demarcated	 by	 those	 conditions?	 This	 question	
does	not	naturally	arise	in	the	current	debates	on	understanding.	Further,	the	usual	attempts	
to	analyze	understanding	tell	us	 little,	 if	anything,	about	why	this	concept	might	differ	 from	
nearby	epistemic	notions,	such	as	knowledge.	Assume,	for	instance,	that	truth	is	a	necessary	
condition	 for	 knowledge	 but	 not	 for	 understanding.	Why	would	 that	 be?	What	 social	 role	
does	a	factive	epistemic	concept	play	and	how	does	it	differ	from	the	social	role	played	by	a	
non-factive	 epistemic	 concept?	 This	 question	 is	 wide	 open	 for	 philosophical	 investigation.	
Thus,	many	of	the	standard	epistemological	debates	about	understanding	should,	I	claim,	be	
                                                
3	Zagzebski	(2001),	Kvanvig	(2003),	Morris	(2012),	and	Hills	(2016)	argue	that	understanding	is	immune	to	
knowledge-undermining	luck.	Pritchard	(2009)	says	understanding	is	incompatible	with	Gettier-type	luck	
but	not	environmental	luck.	Brogaard	(2005),	Grimm	(2006),	Khalifa	(2013),	and	Greco	(2014)	argue	that	
understanding	is	incompatible	with	the	same	type	of	epistemic	luck	as	knowledge.		
4	Kvanvig	(2003)	and	Hills	(2016)	argue	that	understanding,	but	not	propositional	knowledge,	admits	of	
degrees,	whereas	Hetherington	(2001)	says	knowledge-that	is	also	gradable.	Brogaard	(2005),	and	Riaz	
(2015)	argue	that	knowledge-why	is	gradable.		
5	Zagzebski	(2001)	says	understanding	is	transparent	in	the	sense	that	there	is	no	gap	between	seeming	to	
understand	and	understanding.	Trout	(2002)	and	Hills	(2016)	deny	this.		
6	Pritchard	(2009)	and	Hills	(2016)	argue	that	understanding	cannot	be	transmitted	by	testimony,	but	Sliwa	
(2015)	and	Boyd	(2015)	deny	this.		
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regarded	as	a	prolegomenon	to	a	future	(and	I	think	more	interesting)	philosophical	inquiry.7	I	
hope	to	foreground	these	broader	questions	about	the	role	of	understanding	 in	human	life,	
as	well	as	to	throw	new	light	on	epistemic	value.	
	
2.	Function-First	Epistemology			
My	strategy	 is	 to	explore	 the	nature	and	 importance	of	understanding	by	 investigating	
the	role	(or	roles)	of	the	concept	of	understanding	in	our	life.	But,	one	might	ask,	how	do	we	
ascertain	what	role	(or	roles)	this	concept	plays	and	what	conceptual	needs	it	satisfies?		
The	 ‘function-first’	 strategy	 has	 three	 broad	 steps.8	First,	 we	 start	 with	 a	 prima	 facie	
plausible	hypothesis	about	what	the	concept	of	understanding	does	for	us	(i.e.	what	its	role	
is).	For	this	hypothesis	to	be	plausible,	it	must	be	compatible	with	certain	facts	about	human	
life,	 such	 as	 facts	 about	 our	 physical	 environment,	 our	 social	 organization,	 our	 cognitive	
capacities,	and	the	basic	aims	and	interests	we	typically	have.	These	facts	about	humans	and	
their	 circumstances	will	 then	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 certain	 conceptual	 need	 that	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	
satisfied	by	the	purpose	described	in	our	hypothesis.		
Second,	we	 try	 to	 determine	what	 a	 concept	 having	 this	 role	would	 be	 like	 (i.e.	what	
conditions	 would	 govern	 its	 application).	 At	 this	 second	 stage	 we	 can	 perhaps	 gain	 new	
insights	 on	 familiar	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 relationship	 between	 luck	 and	 understanding,	 the	
factivity	 of	 understanding,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 transmitting	 understanding	 through	
testimony.	Once	we	better	appreciate	the	role	of	the	concept	of	understanding	in	human	life	
and	 thought,	 we	 can	 ask	 what	 features	 a	 concept	 that	 satisfies	 this	 role	 would	 have;	 for	
instance,	 would	 the	 presence	 of	 epistemic	 luck	 threaten	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
understanding?	 If	 so,	we	 then	have	a	 reason	 to	 regard	understanding	as	 incompatible	with	
epistemic	 luck.	 I	will	 not	pretend	 to	 resolve	every	 issue	about	 the	nature	of	 understanding	
that	is	raised	in	the	course	of	this	discussion,	but	at	certain	points	I	will	try	to	indicate	where	
the	account	could	be	developed	in	different	ways.		
                                                
7	I	take	this	expression	from	Craig	(1990:	2).		
8	Here	I	elaborate	on	Craig’s	approach	to	knowledge	(1990:	2),	although	my	account	makes	no	detour	
through	imaginary	genealogy.		
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Third,	we	must	examine	the	extent	to	which	this	concept	matches	our	everyday	notion	
of	understanding.	In	this	way,	our	investigation	is	anchored	by	the	everyday	concept	that	we	
are	 looking	 to	explicate.	 If	our	 investigation	were	 to	 reach	a	 result	quite	different	 from	the	
intuitive	 extension	 of	 the	 word	 ‘understands’,	 then,	 “barring	 some	 special	 and	 especially	
plausible	 explanation	 of	 the	 mismatch,	 our	 original	 hypothesis	 about	 the	 role	 that	 the	
concept	plays	in	our	life	would	of	course	be	the	first	casualty”	(Craig	1990:	2).	Our	aim	is	to	
construct	a	concept	that	not	only	functions	in	the	manner	suggested	by	our	hypothesis,	but	
also	one	that	fits	our	intuitions	(or	explains	why	our	intuitions	diverge).	Thus,	while	function	
comes	‘first’	on	this	approach,	it	is	not	the	last	word.		
Function-first	epistemology	is	importantly	different	from	traditional	conceptual	analysis,	
which	 analyzes	 concepts	 by	 “breaking	 them	 down”	 into	 their	 constituent	 parts	 (e.g.	
knowledge	 as	 analyzed	 in	 terms	 of	 justification,	 truth,	 and	 belief).	 Unlike	 traditional	
conceptual	 analysis,	 the	 goal	 of	 my	 inquiry	 is	 not	 to	 enumerate	 the	 necessary	 and/or	
sufficient	 conditions	 for	 understanding	 but	 rather	 to	 clarify	 the	 nature	 and	 origins	 of	 our	
practice	 of	 evaluating	 people	 as	 understanders.	 That	 said,	 function-first	 epistemology	 is	
perfectly	 compatible	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 enumerating	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions.	 I	
simply	regard	it	as	an	open	question	whether	an	account	of	understanding	will	fit	comfortably	
into	a	list	of	such	conditions.	The	danger	is	in	presuming	that	our	concepts	must	be	analyzed	
in	this	traditional	way,	for	this	can	prove	too	restrictive.9		
I	am	motivated	to	try	this	functionalist	approach	because	traditional	conceptual	analysis	
has	 come	under	heavy	 fire	 in	 recent	 years,	 largely	due	 to	 the	work	of	Wittgenstein	 (1953),	
Williamson	(2000),	and	the	fallout	from	the	Gettier	problem.	These	critiques	have	led	many	
to	wonder	whether	conceptual	analysis	really	could	be	the	right	approach	in	epistemology—
and	perhaps	in	philosophy	more	generally.	It	will	therefore	do	no	harm	to	have	an	alternative	
                                                
9	Function-first	epistemology	has	interesting	similarities	and	dissimilarities	with	the	method	of	explication	
(Carnap	1950).	The	task	of	explication	is	to	transform	an	inexact	concept	(the	explicandum)	into	an	exact	
one	(the	explicatum),	effectively	replacing	the	former	with	the	latter.	The	adequacy	of	the	explicatum	is	
assessed	in	light	of	the	theoretical	purpose	it	is	intended	to	serve	in	the	target	theory.	Thus,	like	the	
function-first	approach,	the	method	of	explication	is	related	to	a	purpose;	but	whereas	the	former	refers	to	
the	purpose	that	the	concept	in	question	serves	in	our	life,	the	latter	focuses	on	the	purpose	that	the	
concept	is	intended	to	serve	within	a	target	theory.	For	an	attempt	to	use	the	method	of	explication	to	
provide	an	account	of	understanding,	see	Christoph	Baumberger	(forthcoming).	
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angle	on	our	epistemic	concepts,	especially	one	that	does	not	start	from	particular	judgments	
about	cases	(or	the	extension	of	words	 like	 ‘knows’,	 ‘understands’,	and	so	forth).	 Instead	of	
beginning	with	ordinary	usage,	we	might	learn	something	new	if	we	begin	by	reflecting	on	the	
purposes	of	epistemic	evaluation.	Whether	or	not	this	approach	succeeds,	it	will	be	useful	to	
see	how	far	we	can	get	with	this	line	of	inquiry.		
Unlike	 traditional	 conceptual	 analysis,	 function-first	 epistemology	 goes	 beyond	 the	
project	of	merely	describing	our	epistemic	concepts	and	practices;	 it	allows	us	 to	engage	 in	
the	normative	project	of	evaluating	how	well	or	poorly	our	practices	actually	satisfy	our	needs	
and	goals.	By	 taking	 function	 ‘first’	we	can	assess	our	 current	practices	 in	 light	of	 the	 roles	
that	epistemic	evaluation	is	supposed	to	serve,	and	thus	we	can	aim	to	improve	our	practices.	
In	 contrast,	 methodologies	 that	 rest	 too	 heavily	 on	 ordinary	 usage	 or	 intuitive	 judgments	
about	 cases	 will	 only	 end	 up	 describing	 our	 actual	 practices,	 not	 characterizing	 those	 that	
would	be	best	for	us.	These	descriptive	approaches	might	be	useful	for	other	goals,	such	as	
explaining	 aspects	 of	 human	 cognition.	 But	what	 is	 unsatisfying	 about	 these	 approaches	 is	
they	simply	assume	the	propriety	of	our	ordinary	practices	of	epistemic	evaluation;	they	do	
nothing	to	say	why	we	should	think	these	practices	are	actually	worthy	of	our	endorsement.	
Function-first	 epistemology	 allows	 for	 genuine	 epistemic	 normativity	 without	 being	
indifferent	 to	how	 the	 results	 of	 our	 approach	 tally	with	ordinary	 language,	 our	 judgments	
about	cases,	and	our	current	epistemic	practices.		
	
3.	What’s	the	Point	of	Understanding?		
That’s	enough	about	the	job	description—now	on	to	the	job	itself.	Why	do	we	attribute	
understanding?	What	 role	does	 this	 concept	play	 in	human	 life?	Answering	 this	question	 is	
the	 first	 step	 in	 the	 three-stage	 strategy	 outlined	 above.	 The	 hypothesis	 I	 want	 to	 test	 is:	
attributions	 of	 understanding	 are	 primarily	 used	 to	 identify	 individuals	who	 can	provide	 us	
with	explanations.	Put	more	briefly,	I	hypothesize	that	‘understands’	identifies	explainers.		
This	 isn’t	 just	 wild	 speculation.	 In	 his	 Posterior	 Analytics,	 Aristotle	 discusses	 the	 close	
connection	 between	 explanation	 and	 understanding,	 and	 this	 conceptual	 link	 is	 widely	
acknowledged	in	the	contemporary	literature.	Here	are	a	few	representative	statements:		
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[U]nderstanding,	 as	 Salmon	puts	 it,	 results	 from	 ‘our	ability	 to	 fashion	explanations’.	
That	is	almost	tautological.	(Kim	1996:	61)	
	
Understanding	 without	 explanation?	 Impossible,	 or	 so	 I	 will	 argue—in	 the	 case	 of	
science,	at	least.	(Strevens	2013:	510)	
	
[I]f	you	understand	why	p,	you	can	give	an	explanation	of	why	p	and	you	can	do	the	
same	in	similar	circumstances.	(Hills	2016:	663)	
	
While	 the	 link	 between	 explanation	 and	 understanding	 can	 be	 filled	 out	 in	 different	ways,	
several	philosophers	have	argued	that	one	must	be	able	to	give	a	correct	explanation	to	have	
understanding.10	Khalifa	 (2011:	108),	 for	 instance,	 says	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	understand	why	a	
phenomenon	took	place	without	believing	a	correct	explanation	for	it.	And	de	Regt	(2009:	25)	
claims	that	understanding	a	phenomenon	just	is	having	an	explanation	of	that	phenomenon.	
Thus,	 the	 idea	 that	 explanation	 plays	 an	 indispensible	 role	 in	 understanding	 is	 not	 all	 that	
new,	and	certainly	not	mere	speculation.		
You	might	worry	that	my	hypothesis	gets	things	backwards.	Shouldn’t	we	characterize	a	
good	explainer	in	terms	of	understanding	rather	than	the	other	way	around?	In	other	words,	
doesn’t	one	need	to	have	understanding	to	qualify	as	a	good	explainer?		
This	is	a	natural	concern.	But	despite	the	allure	of	this	idea,	I	will	try	to	cast	doubt	on	it	
by	developing	a	more	plausible	 alternative.	 I	maintain	 that	understanding	 is	most	plausibly	
understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 good	 explainer;	 viz.,	 we	 get	 to	 the	 nature	 of	
understanding	by	reflecting	on	the	criteria	for	being	a	good	explainer.	It	is	by	starting	with	the	
idea	of	an	explanation-seeking	 inquirer	 that	we	are	ultimately	 led	 to	a	plausible	account	of	
the	nature	and	value	of	understanding.	Thus,	my	goal	is	to	throw	light	on	what	understanding	
is	 by	 thinking	 about	 the	 point	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 understanding.	 As	 a	 pragmatist,	 my	
investigation	has	 a	 second-order,	 or	 linguistic,	 focus.	 Instead	 of	 asking	 about	 the	 nature	 of	
                                                
10	See	Strevens	(2013),	Greco	(2014),	and	Hills	(2016).	
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epistemic	facts,	states,	or	values,	I	start	by	investigating	the	nature	of	epistemic	evaluations.	
This	 is	a	controversial	starting	point,	but	the	reader	may	 judge	whether	or	not	my	proposal	
succeeds	by	its	fruits.11	
This	 hypothesis—that	 attributions	 of	 understanding	 are	 used	 to	 certify	 explainers—
makes	 the	 connection	between	explanation	 and	understanding	quite	 clear.	 But	why	do	we	
care	 about	 identifying	 explainers?	 This	 question	 needs	 an	 answer	 if	 we	 are	 to	 clarify	 the	
importance	of	understanding	in	epistemic	evaluation.		
The	 answer	 is	 simple:	 we	 care	 about	 identifying	 explainers	 because	 we	 value	
explanations.	Humans	are	driven	to	acquire	and	provide	explanations	in	a	variety	of	domains.	
We	seek	to	understand,	and	thus	explain,	the	origins	of	the	universe,	why	some	actions	are	
morally	wrong,	the	cause	of	a	rash,	and	so	on.	Our	quest	for	explanations	is	strikingly	domain	
general,	as	Gopnik	points	out:		
	
We	 seek	 and	 are	 satisfied	 by	 explanations	 of	 physical	 objects,	 animate	 beings,	
psychological	agents,	and	even	social	groups.	We	seek	and	are	satisfied	by	explanations	
in	terms	of	physical	laws,	biological	processes,	reasons,	or	rules.	(Gopnik	2000:	311)		
		
Even	children	ask	 ‘Why?’	within	months	of	uttering	their	 first	words,	and	this	question	cuts	
across	 domains	 for	 them	 as	 well	 (Wellman	 et	 al.	 1997).	 Humans,	 it	 seems,	 are	 natural	
explanation-seekers.	The	unmet	need	for	an	explanation	can	leave	us	irritated	or	unsatisfied	
in	a	way	that	compels	us	to	seek	a	resolution.		
Humans	seek	explanations,	but	what	are	explanations?	They	have	been	characterized	in	
a	 variety	 of	 ways,	 with	 different	 theories	 offering	 different	 constraints	 that	 would-be	
explanations	 have	 to	 obey.	 For	 example,	 Hempel	 and	 Oppenheim	 (1948)	 require	 an	
explanation	 to	 make	 essential	 use	 of	 a	 law	 of	 nature.	 Unificationist	 theories	 state	 that	
                                                
11	Two	additional	points	are	worth	mentioning.	First,	anyone	who	claims	that	a	good	explainer	should	be	
characterized	in	terms	of	understanding	would	still	owe	us	an	account	of	what	understanding	is.	In	contrast,	
I	hope	to	shed	light	on	the	nature	of	understanding	by	reflecting	on	the	criteria	for	being	a	good	explainer,	
thereby	providing	a	fuller	account.	Second,	anyone	who	is	unconvinced	that	we	can	get	at	the	nature	of	
understanding	by	investigating	the	role	of	the	concept	of	understanding	can	still	take	my	argument	to	
illuminate	the	nature,	purpose,	and	value	of	the	concept	of	understanding	in	human	life.		
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explanations	are	deductions	that	are	tokens	of	the	most	unifying	types	of	argument	(Kitcher	
1989,	Schurz	1999,	and	Gijsbers	2013:	517).	Causal	theorists	maintain	that	events	can	only	be	
explained	by	their	causes	(Salmon	1984,	Strevens	2008,	and	Woodward	2003).	While	there	is	
surely	 some	 truth	 in	 each	 of	 these	 views,	 there	 is	 no	 compelling	 reason	 to	 think	 all	
explanations	must	have	a	common	structure	or	function.	The	research	on	explanations	spans	
multiple	 kinds	 of	 judgments	 and	 distinct	 cognitive	 mechanisms.	 Thus,	 we	 should	 be	
permissive	about	what	counts	as	an	‘explanation’.		
This	 pluralist	 view	 does	 not	 prevent	 us	 from	 offering	 a	 general	 characterization	 of	
explanations.	 Like	 any	 family	 resemblance	 term,	 we	 can	 pick	 out	 a	 cluster	 of	 overlapping	
similarities,	even	if	there	is	no	set	of	necessary	and	sufficient	features	that	will	account	for	all	
the	things	we	call	‘explanations’.	For	example,	explanations	are	typically	the	answers	to	‘why’	
or	‘how’	questions.	These	answers	will	often	refer	to	causal	relations,	but	not	all	explanations	
must	 pick	 out	 causal	 relations;	 for	 instance,	 explanations	 given	 in	mathematics	 or	morality	
are	unlikely	 to	be	causal.	12	We	should	expect	different	kinds	of	explanations	 from	different	
subject	 matters.	 Thus,	 an	 attractive	 strategy	 proposed	 by	 Kim	 (1994),	 Greco	 (2014),	 and	
Grimm	(2014)	is	to	put	aside	the	narrow	focus	on	causation	and	appeal	to	the	more	general	
notion	of	dependence.	On	this	view,	dependence	is	the	genus	category	with	different	kinds	of	
dependence—causal,	 mereological,	 grounding—playing	 the	 role	 of	 species	 (Grimm	 2014:	
341).	Unlike	much	of	 the	 literature	on	 explanation,	which	has	 been	 firmly	 grounded	 in	 the	
philosophy	 of	 science,	 this	 sort	 of	 explanatory	 pluralism	 allows	 us	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 our	
pervasive	use	of	non-scientific	explanations	in	daily	life.	
I	 have	 argued	 that	 identifying	 explainers	 is	 important	 because	 seeking	 explanations	 is	
central	 to	 human	 inquiry,	 but	 I	 have	 not	 yet	 said	much	 about	why	we	 value	 explanations.	
What	is	so	great	about	them?	I	think	our	interest	in	explanations	has	two	general	sources:	we	
seek	them	for	practical	reasons	as	well	as	purely	epistemic	reasons.		
There	 are	 many	 practical	 incentives	 for	 wanting	 to	 explain	 our	 environment.	 For	
example,	 the	 process	 of	 seeking	 explanations	 facilitates	 the	 discovery	 and	 confirmation	 of	
                                                
12	Keil	(2006)	and	Murphy	and	Medin	(1985)	argue	that	the	vast	majority	of	our	everyday	explanations	
invoke	notions	of	cause	and	effect.		
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instrumentally	valuable	theories,	which	contributes	to	predicting	future	events.	This,	in	turn,	
enhances	our	ability	to	control	changes	in	our	environment.	As	Craik	puts	it,		
	
the	power	 to	 explain	 involves	 the	power	of	 insight	 and	 anticipation,	 and	 this	 is	 very	
valuable	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 distance-receptor	 in	 time,	 which	 enables	 organisms	 to	 adapt	
themselves	to	situations	which	are	about	to	arise.	(1943:	7)	
	
As	a	means	 to	anticipating	and	accommodating	 the	 future,	explanations	have	clear	 survival	
value.	 Thus,	 explanations	 serve	 an	 important	 practical	 function	 in	 guiding	 our	 interactions	
with	the	world.		
Explanations	 also	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 justifying	 or	 rationalizing	 action.	 Why	 did	 the	
Ancient	Egyptians	mummify	their	dead?	Why	is	Tom	being	such	a	jerk	lately?	Questions	that	
call	 for	 explanations,	 and	 explanations	 for	 human	 action	 in	 particular,	 are	 among	 the	
commonest	questions	we	have.	Why	did	Othello	 kill	Desdemona?	To	 answer	 this	 question,	
we	 need	 an	 explanation	 for	 his	 action,	 namely,	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 believed	 Desdemona	 was	
unfaithful	to	him	(among	other	facts,	presumably).		
An	 emerging	 body	 of	 research	 from	 the	 cognitive	 sciences	 demonstrates	 that	 both	
explanation	(the	process)	and	explanations	(the	products)	have	many	other	practical	benefits	
for	everyday	cognition.13	I	do	not	have	space	to	discuss	this	literature	in	detail,	but	Lombrozo	
(2011)	 nicely	 summarizes	 these	 findings.	 She	 discusses	 how	 engaging	 in	 explanation	 can	
facilitate	learning,	guide	exploration,	and	influence	decision-making.	Explanations	also	play	a	
role	 in	motivating	 the	 construction	 of	 causal	 theories,	 resolving	 inconsistencies,	 calibrating	
meta-cognition,	and	diagnosing	and	repairing	 things.	Thus,	explanations	clearly	have	critical	
prudential	value.		
But	a	purely	prudential	account	of	explanatory	inquiry	would	be	too	limited.	Beyond	our	
practical	concerns,	we	also	have	a	desire	to	make	sense	of	the	world	rooted	in	what	Hempel	
(1965)	 calls	 “sheer	 intellectual	 curiosity”.	We	 are	 fascinated	 by	why	 the	 dinosaurs	 became	
extinct	even	though	knowing	its	cause	would	have	little,	if	any,	practical	impact	on	our	lives.	
                                                
13	For	reviews,	see	Keil	(2006)	and	Lombrozo	(2006,	2011).		
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Some	questions	attract	our	curiosity	even	though	their	answers	have	no	practical	value	for	us.	
This	point	is	widely	acknowledged.	Goldman	talks	about	the	desire	for	truth	“for	its	own	sake,	
not	for	ulterior	ends”	(1998:	98).	Grimm	distinguishes	“epistemic	curiosity”,	which	responds	
to	 our	 sense	 of	 puzzlement,	 from	 “prudential	 curiosity”,	 which	 responds	 to	 some	 basic	
prudential	concerns	of	ours	(2008:	737).	And	Strevens	opens	his	book,	Depth:	An	Account	of	
Scientific	Explanation,	with	the	following	lines:		
	
If	science	provides	anything	of	intrinsic	value,	it	is	explanation.	Prediction	and	control	
are	useful,	and	success	in	any	endeavor	is	gratifying,	but	when	science	is	pursued	as	an	
end	 rather	 than	 a	means,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 understanding	 –	 the	moment	when	 a	
small,	temporary	being	reaches	out	to	touch	the	universe	and	makes	contact.	(2008:	3)	
	
In	other	words,	our	 second	basic	motivation	 for	explanatory	 inquiry	 is	our	deep	concern	 to	
make	sense	of	the	world	we	live	in,	to	explain	the	unending	flow	of	our	experiences.		
Our	interest	in	explanations	thus	has	two	sources:	we	have	many	practical	incentives	for	
wanting	 to	 explain	 our	 environment,	 but	 explanations	 can	 also	 be	 rewarding	 in	 their	 own	
right,	 independently	 of	 whatever	 practical	 benefits	 they	 might	 confer.	 Both	 of	 these	 facts	
explain	why	humans	need	to	identify	explainers.	We	value	explanations,	but	as	finite	beings	
with	 limited	 cognitive	 resources	 we	 cannot	 figure	 out	 everything	 on	 our	 own.	 Instead	 we	
often	must	 rely	on	the	testimony	of	others.	Thus,	we	have	an	 interest	 in	 identifying	people	
who	 can	 provide	 us	 with	 explanations.	 I	 hypothesize	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 understanding	 is	
used	to	pick	out	explainers.	In	this	way,	the	concept	of	understanding	plays	an	important	role	
in	the	general	economy	of	our	concepts.			
	
4.	Refinements	
Is	 this	hypothesis	 too	narrow?	Aren’t	 there	many	possible	 situations	 in	which	a	person	
can	 have	 understanding	 and	 yet	 not	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 an	 explanation?	 For	 example,	
explanation	seems	to	be	linguistic	and	explicit,	but	someone	who	cannot	speak	or	write	can	
surely	 have	 understanding.	 Also,	 a	 person	 like	 Robinson	 Crusoe	 might	 understand	 many	
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things	and	yet	not	function	as	an	informant	or	explainer	for	anybody.	So	why	should	we	think	
attributions	 of	 understanding	 are	 used	 to	 identify	 people	 who	 can	 provide	 us	 with	
explanations?	Further,	 inquirers	will	not	 settle	 for	 just	any	explanation:	 they	want	good	 (or	
true)	 explanations.	 In	 all	 of	 these	 cases,	 a	 gap	 seems	 to	 open	 up	 between	 our	 natural	
ascriptions	of	understanding	and	the	concept	we	have	arrived	at	by	considering	the	practical	
situation	of	an	explanation-seeker.		
I	 will	 be	 the	 first	 to	 admit	 that	 we	 may	 need	 to	 supplement	 or	 modify	 our	 initial	
hypothesis,	especially	if	it	doesn’t	issue	a	concept	that	is	at	least	very	similar	to	our	everyday	
notion	 of	 understanding.	 But	 this	 is	 no	 reason	 for	 despair.	 It	 is	 a	 good	 policy	 to	 test	 the	
explanatory	 powers	 of	 the	 simple	 before	 resorting	 to	 the	 more	 complex,	 even	 if	 a	 more	
complex	 hypothesis	 is	 ultimately	 needed.	 Thus,	 I	 will	 now	 introduce	 some	 refinements	 to	
stave	off	objections	and	hopefully	enhance	my	proposal’s	plausibility.			
First,	 my	 hypothesis	 is	 best	 construed	 as	 an	 account	 of	 understanding-why.	
Understanding-why	 is	 at	 the	 center	 of	 a	 lot	 of	 recent	work	 in	 epistemology,	 as	well	 as	 the	
philosophy	 of	 science,	 and	 many	 scholars	 regard	 it	 as	 the	 paradigmatic	 form	 of	
understanding.14	Some	examples	of	understanding-why	include:	I	understand	why	the	Earth’s	
average	temperature	is	increasing;	I	understand	why	that	driver	ran	a	red	light;	I	understand	
why	the	sky	is	blue.	My	hypothesis	 is	meant	to	provide	an	account	of	understanding-why	p,	
where	p	is	some	proposition.	I	am	especially	interested	in	this	type	of	understanding	because	
the	 social	 function	 of	 epistemic	 evaluation	 seems	 deeply	 linked	 to	 the	 transmission	 of	
information,	and	propositions	are	the	most	common	vehicle	of	transmittable	information.		
Pritchard	takes	paradigm	uses	of	‘understands’	to	be	statements	like	“I	understand	why	p	
is	 the	case”,	but	he	says	understanding	usually	 isn’t	 concerned	with	propositions.	He	thinks	
this	because	“it	is	rare	to	talk	of	understanding	that	p”	(Pritchard	2010:	74,	emphasis	mine).15	
However,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 to	 understand	 why	 p	 one’s	 understanding	 must	 be	 directed	
                                                
14	Pritchard	(2010),	Hempel	(1965),	Kitcher	(1989),	Grimm	(2008),	de	Regt	(2009),	Khalifa	(2012),	Strevens	
(2013),	and	Hills	(2016)	all	focus	on	understanding-why.	Pritchard	and	Hills	say	it	is	the	paradigmatic	form	of	
understanding,	although	this	is	not	uncontroversial	(see	Kvanvig	2003	and	Elgin	2007).	
15	This	is	actually	false.	Peter	van	Elswyk	surveyed	instances	of	“understanding	that”	in	the	Corpus	of	
Contemporary	American	English	(COCA)	and	found	they	outnumber	instances	of	“understanding	why”	more	
than	2	to	1.		
 
 
 
13 
 
towards	a	set	of	propositions,	namely,	those	reasons	as	to	why	p	 is	the	case	(see	Hills	2016	
and	Boyd	2016).	Thus,	Pritchard’s	reasoning	does	not	necessarily	speak	against	the	idea	that	
the	information	content	of	understanding-why	is	propositional.		
Understanding-why	is	often	contrasted	with	two	other	kinds	of	understanding:	practical	
and	objectual.	Practical	understanding,	or	understanding-how,	is	more	closely	tied	to	abilities	
or	 skills	 than	 explanations.	 For	 example,	 a	 player	who	 understands	 how	 to	 catch	 a	 fly	 ball	
might	be	unable	to	explain	how	he	can	do	this	and	explanations	seem	inadequate	to	imbue	
such	 a	 skill.16	Objectual	 understanding,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 more	 holistic.	 It	 is	 usually	 attributed	
using	the	verb	‘understands’	followed	directly	by	a	noun;	for	example,	“Elizabeth	understands	
American	History”	and	“Lana	understands	quantum	physics”.17		
According	 to	Khalifa	 (2013),	objectual	understanding	can	be	reduced	to	understanding-
why.	 Similarly,	 Grimm	 (2016)	 argues	 that	 understanding-why	 and	 objectual	 understanding	
differ	only	in	degree,	not	in	kind.	To	the	extent	that	objectual	understanding	can	be	reduced	
to	 understanding-why,	 my	 claims	 about	 understanding-why	 will	 translate	 to	 the	 objectual	
case.	 This	 would	 increase	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 my	 account.	 Further,	 we	 invoke	
explanations	not	only	to	shed	light	on	why	something	happened	but	also	to	explain	how	to	do	
things,	what	 to	 do	 in	 a	 given	 situation,	 and	what	 happened.	 This	 provides	 some	 reason	 to	
think	our	need	for	good	explainers	isn’t	limited	to	cases	of	understanding-why.	Nevertheless,	
there	is	likely	a	non-reducible	variety	of	uses	of	the	word	‘understands’,	not	all	of	which	can	
be	 assimilated	 to	 my	 explanatory	 account.	 So	 while	 I	 am	 open	 to	 the	 possibility	 that	 my	
account	may	shed	light	on	other	types	of	understanding,	I	shall	limit	all	subsequent	remarks	
about	‘understanding’	to	cases	of	understanding-why.		
A	 second	 refinement	 is	 needed.	 Our	 current	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 attributions	 of	
understanding	 are	 used	 to	 identify	 explainers,	 but	 not	 just	 any	 explainer	 will	 do.	 A	 street	
psychic	might	tell	me	that	my	marriage	is	struggling	because	my	wife	has	a	conflicting	zodiac	
                                                
16	Not	all	cases	of	understanding-how	are	incompatible	with	my	account.	Some	‘how’	questions	demand	
explanations;	for	example,	“How	do	seahorses	reproduce?”	Thus,	we	cannot	distinguish	understanding-why	
from	other	types	of	understanding	solely	in	terms	of	their	grammatical	form.	Nevertheless,	I	hope	to	make	
use	of	a	distinction	between	various	forms	of	understanding	that	is	widely	accepted	in	the	epistemology	of	
understanding	in	order	to	delimit	the	focus	of	my	paper.	
17	Kvanvig	(2003),	Elgin	(2007),	Wilkenfeld	(2014),	and	Kelp	(2015)	investigate	objectual	understanding.	
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sign,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 a	 good	 explanation	 of	 our	 unfortunate	 situation.	 Even	 if	 I	 believed	 in	
astrology	and	would	 thus	get	 the	 ‘sense’	of	understanding	 from	this	explanation,	 that	does	
not	 suffice	 to	 make	 it	 a	 good	 explanation.	 A	 good	 explanation	 is	 genuinely	 explanatory.	
Astrology,	however,	does	not	correctly	explain	the	cosmic	order.	Thus,	our	initial	hypothesis	
needs	 a	 slight	 modification,	 namely,	 attributions	 of	 understanding	 are	 used	 to	 mark	 out	
people	who	 can	 provide	 us	with	good	 explanations.	 In	 short,	 ‘understands’	 identifies	good	
explainers.18		
Three	clarifications	are	in	order.	First,	it	is	implausible	that	one	can	understand	why	p	if	it	
is	not	the	case	that	p.	For	example,	you	cannot	understand	why	Jesse	James	robbed	the	bank	
if	he	did	not	rob	the	bank.	Likewise,	you	cannot	understand	why	Brad	Pitt	dumped	Jennifer	
Aniston	if	he	did	not	dump	her.	Thus,	understanding-why	turns	out	to	be	factive	in	basically	
the	same	way	that	knowledge	is	factive.	It	is	widely	accepted	that	S	fails	to	know	p	if	p	is	false.	
Likewise,	we	should	accept	 that	S	 fails	 to	understand	why	p	 if	 it	 is	not	 the	case	 that	p.	The	
explanandum	must	be	true	if	one	is	to	have	understanding-why.	This	sheds	some	light	what	
our	 concept	of	understanding	 is	 like	 (i.e.	 the	 second	 step	of	 the	 function-first	 approach).	 If	
understanding-why	 were	 not	 factive,	 it	 likely	 wouldn’t	 satisfy	 our	 need	 to	 identify	 good	
explainers.19	
Second,	 one	 might	 claim	 that	 an	 explanation	 must	 by	 definition	 be	 genuinely	
explanatory;	 in	other	words,	a	 false	explanation	would	be	no	explanation	at	all.	However,	 I	
think	conspiracy	theorists	can	provide	explanations	for	events	even	when	these	explanations	
                                                
18	You	might	wonder	why	we	need	the	concept	of	understanding	if	we	already	have	the	concept	of	a	good	
explainer.	However,	I	am	using	‘good	explainer’	as	a	theoretically	fertile	philosophical	notion,	not	as	a	term	
that	has	lay	currency.	It	is	designed	to	be	a	limiting	concept	that	might	be	different	from	any	folk	
conception	of	this	expression.	
19	A	far	more	complicated	issue	is	whether	the	explanans	must	also	be	true.	According	to	some	scholars,	a	
factive	conception	of	understanding	“cannot	do	justice	to	the	cognitive	contributions	of	science”	(Elgin	
2007:	32).	For	example,	scientists	purport	to	understand	the	behavior	of	actual	gases	by	reference	to	so-
called	ideal	gas,	even	though	there	is	no	such	gas.	Elgin	calls	these	“felicitous	falsehoods”	(2007:	39).	I	will	
not	pretend	to	resolve	this	contentious	matter	here,	but	I	will	offer	two	brief	remarks.	First,	I	find	it	
plausible	that	some	cases	of	understanding	are	not	factive	(or	only	quasi-factive);	however,	these	are	not	
typically	cases	of	understanding-why.	Elgin	seems	to	grant	this	point	in	her	new	book	(2017:	40).	A	non-
factive	conception	of	understanding	is	far	more	plausible	in	cases	of	objectual	understanding	than	
understanding-why.	Second,	Hazlett	(2017)	has	convinced	me	that	understanding-why	is	a	species	of	
correct	representation.	As	such,	understanding-why	p	will	require	“correctly	representing	E	as	the	
explanation	for	the	fact	that	p,	which	entails	that	E	is	the	explanation	of	the	fact”	(2017:	138-9).		
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are	 false.	 They	 simply	 do	 not	 provide	 good	 explanations	 (because	 they	 are	 not	 genuinely	
explanatory).		
Third,	it	might	be	the	case	that	what	counts	as	a	good	explanation	(and	perhaps	even	an	
explanation	at	 all)	 varies	 contextually,	both	between	 speakers	and	 for	 the	 same	speaker	at	
different	times.	I	will	return	to	the	issue	of	context	sensitivity	at	the	end	of	this	section.		
On	 the	 table	 now	 is	 the	 following	 modified	 version	 of	 our	 initial	 hypothesis:	
‘understands’	 certifies	good	 explainers.	 But	 this	 hypothesis	 still	 faces	 objections.	 There	 are	
situations	in	which	a	person	seems	to	count	as	an	‘understander’	even	though	that	person	is	
unable	 to	provide	a	 good	explanation.	 Suppose	Barney	 is	 unable	 to	 speak	and	write,	 so	he	
cannot	provide	us	with	an	explanation	for	why	the	floor	is	covered	in	milk.	Still,	Barney	might	
understand	why	there	is	milk	on	the	floor	because	he	saw	what	happened.	Thus,	attributions	
of	understanding	do	not	seem	to	certify	good	explainers—or	so	the	objection	goes.		
This	objection	can	be	straightforwardly	answered.	Barney’s	 lack	of	verbal	and	 linguistic	
abilities	might	render	him	unable	to	provide	us	with	a	good	explanation,	but	 if	Barney	truly	
understands	why	there	is	milk	on	the	floor,	then	he	must	be	able	to	adequately	explain	this	to	
himself.	 If	he	 cannot	 formulate	an	explanation	 for	himself,	he	 lacks	understanding.	As	 John	
Searle	once	said,	“If	you	can’t	say	it	clearly,	you	don’t	understand	it	yourself.”	Thus,	there	is	a	
sense	in	which	Barney	can	provide	a	good	explanation,	even	if	he	cannot	explain	it	to	us	due	
to	 certain	 communicative	 obstacles.	 It	 would	 be	 pedantry	 to	 say	 that	 he	 understands	 but	
cannot	explain.	Even	 if	he	cannot	express	 it,	he	does	have	a	good	explanation	 (see	Gijsbers	
2013:	518).	I	might	add	that	a	particular	individual’s	inability	to	communicate	an	explanation	
does	not	imply	the	explanation	is	inherently	incommunicable,	but	merely	that	at	present	they	
are	the	wrong	person	for	the	job.	Another	way	of	putting	this	point	is	that	we	are	interested	
in	 identifying	 people	 who	 have	 good	 explanations.	 Presumably	 we	 are	 interested	 in	
identifying	such	people	because	it	is	in	our	collective	interest	to	mark	out	individuals	who	can	
share	their	explanations	with	us	and	with	others.		
A	 consequence	 of	 this	 view	 is	 that	 infants	 lack	 understanding-why.	 According	 to	 some	
cognitive	psychologists,	infants	can	show	tacit	understanding	even	though	they	are	unable	to	
provide	 an	 explanation	 (and	 also	 a	 self-explanation).	 For	 example,	 Clements	 and	 Perner	
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(1994)	claim	that	infants	implicitly	understand	that	some	agent	holds	a	false	belief	about	the	
location	of	an	object	on	the	grounds	that	these	children	will	look	at	the	area	where	the	agent	
mistakenly	 believes	 the	 object	 is	 located	 (as	 opposed	 to	 where	 the	 children,	 but	 not	 the	
agent,	 saw	 the	 object	was	moved).	 However,	 this	 phenomenon	 can	 easily	 be	 described	 as	
cases	 in	 which	 young	 children	 show	 some	awareness	of	 false	 beliefs	 without	 really	 having	
understanding-why.	As	Perner	and	Ruffman	(2005:	214)	argue,	the	apparent	success	on	these	
theory-of-mind	 tasks	 can	 be	 explained	 without	 supposing	 that	 infants	 have	 any	
understanding	of	the	belief	at	all.20		
Why,	then,	do	we	sometimes	attribute	understanding	to	young	children?	As	Elgin	(2017:	
30)	points	out,	we	can	use	epistemic	success	terms	in	ways	that	reflect	a	‘courtesy	usage’;	for	
instance,	we	might	say	that	a	young	child	has	some	understanding	of	photosynthesis	because	
she	 thinks	 that	sunlight	 is	 the	 flower’s	 food.	 I	 find	 it	 feasible	 to	dismiss	such	attributions	of	
understanding	as	mere	courtesy	usage—or	what	Kvanvig	 (2003)	calls	 ‘honorific’	uses.	 If	you	
are	 unconvinced	 by	 this	move,	 I	 ask	 you	 to	 reconsider	 whether	 these	 children	 really	 have	
understanding-why.	 Perhaps	 there	 are	 plausible	 cases	 in	 which	 children	 have	 objectual	
understanding	or	understanding-that,	but	 it	 is	 less	plausible	 to	 say	 that	a	 child	who	cannot	
formulate	any	explanation	for	why	a	phenomenon	occurred	(even	roughly	and	to	herself)	has	
understood	 why	 the	 phenomenon	 occurs.	 Acknowledging	 this	 does	 not	 prevent	 us	 from	
saying	 something	about	what	makes	 the	view	of	one	child	better	 than	 the	view	of	another	
child.	The	child	who	thinks	that	sunlight	is	the	flower’s	food	may	still	know	more,	or	be	closer	
to	understanding	photosynthesis,	than	the	child	who	thinks	that	flower’s	survive	on	magical	
powder.		
It	is	also	worth	pointing	out	that	what	counts	as	‘providing	an	explanation’	can	be	filled	
out	in	a	number	of	ways,	not	all	of	which	might	be	linguistic.	Perhaps	you	can	show	me	what	
happened,	even	if	you	cannot	tell	me	or	write	it	down.	But	even	if	there	is	no	way	for	you	to	
provide	 me	 (or	 anyone	 but	 yourself)	 with	 an	 explanation,	 this	 obstacle	 is	 really	 no	 more	
worrying	 than	a	 situation	 in	which	you	cannot	provide	us	with	an	explanation	because	you	
are	nowhere	to	be	found.	Someone	who	cannot	be	 located	can	still,	 in	an	 important	sense,	
                                                
20	I	set	aside	animal	understanding	because	I	am	providing	an	account	of	human	understanding.		
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provide	 a	 good	explanation—she	 simply	 cannot	 provide	 it	 to	 us	 right	 now.	As	 information-
dependent	beings,	 it	 is	 in	our	 interest	to	 identify	people	as	good	explainers	even	if	they	are	
not	functioning	as	a	good	explainer	at	a	specific	moment.	After	all,	we	can	often	rely	on	such	
people	for	communicating	explanatory	information	under	the	right	circumstances	(e.g.	if	we	
can	find	them	and	if	they	are	willing	to	tell	us).		
Potentially	worrying	cases	involving	isolated	individuals,	such	as	Robinson	Crusoe,	can	be	
dealt	 with	 in	 a	 similar	 way.	 You	 might	 worry	 that	 the	 social	 function	 of	 identifying	 good	
explainers	 leaves	mysterious	why	 there	are	 cases	of	understanding	 that	do	not	 involve	any	
interpersonal	relations.	But	there	are	at	least	two	reasons	to	regard	someone	as	an	explainer	
even	if	no	one	else	is	around.	First,	we	can	explain	things	to	ourselves,	as	already	mentioned.	
Second,	it	is	important	that	we	have	a	practice	whereby	people	can	declare	themselves	to	be	
good	explainers	because	 they	 themselves	will	often	be	 the	only	people	 in	a	position	 to	 tell	
whether	they	are	qualified	or	not.	An	understander	is	someone	who	meets	a	sufficiently	high-
quality	epistemic	position	such	that	potential	inquirers	could	in	principle	rely	on	this	person’s	
information,	even	if	nobody	actually	does	ever	seek	such	an	informant.	This	explains	why	we	
would	want	to	say	that	someone	understands	why	p	even	though	that	person	is	not	actually	
functioning	as	an	explainer	for	anybody.	
This	account	is	also	compatible	with	the	highly	plausible	idea	that	understanding	comes	
in	degrees,	thereby	casting	additional	light	on	what	our	concept	of	understanding	is	like	(Elgin	
2007,	 Grimm	 2014,	 and	 Hills	 2016).	 The	 quality	 of	 explanations	 comes	 in	 degrees,	 so	
attributions	 of	 understanding	 will	 track	 these	 differences	 in	 quality.	 I	 will	 not	 provide	 a	
detailed	 account	 of	 explanatory	 quality	 here,	 but	 it	 will	 suffice	 to	 note	 that	 the	 quality	 of	
explanations	 varies	 along	 at	 least	 two	 dimensions:	 depth	 and	 breadth.	 The	
comprehensiveness	of	 the	body	of	 information	contained	 in	an	explanation	can	 increase	 its	
breadth,	while	a	causal	model	that	is	more	abstract	is	deeper	(Strevens	2008).	Railton	(1981)	
says	an	explanation	that	traces	an	event’s	causal	history	back	farther	in	time	is	better	for	it,	
and	Hills	 (2016)	argues	that	one’s	understanding	can	be	better	or	worse	depending	on	how	
good	one	is	at	explaining	things	in	one’s	own	words.		
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How	 deep	 or	 broad	 an	 explanation	 must	 be	 for	 the	 explainer	 to	 qualify	 as	 an	
understander	will	 likely	depend	on	context.	Thus,	the	concept	of	understanding	will	 in	some	
way	be	context	sensitive.	I	do	not	have	space	to	delve	into	this	complicated	matter	here,	but	I	
will	point	out	that	context	can	affect	the	epistemic	standard	for	understanding	in	one	of	two	
ways.	On	the	one	hand,	the	threshold	for	understanding	might	be	invariant	even	though	our	
willingness	to	attribute	understanding	is	affected	by	context.	According	to	this	view,	it	might	
be	inappropriate	to	attribute	understanding	to	someone	who	meets	the	(fixed)	threshold	for	
understanding	because	 it	would	generate	the	 false	 implicature	that	her	explanation	 is	good	
enough	 for	 the	 context.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 threshold	 for	 who	 truly	 qualifies	 as	 an	
understander	 (and	 not	 just	 when	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 attribute	 understanding)	 might	 itself	
vary	 with	 context.	 I	 want	 to	 remain	 neutral	 on	 this	 issue,	 but	 I	 will	 register	 that	 I	 incline	
towards	 the	 latter	 view.	 This	 is	 because	 who	 truly	 counts	 as	 a	 good	 explainer	 will	 likely	
depend	in	part	on	the	circumstances	and	one’s	audience.	For	example,	one	might	qualify	as	a	
good	explainer	in	the	context	of	a	third	grade	classroom	but	not	at	a	professional	meeting	of	
experts	 in	 the	 relevant	 field.	 Thus,	 in	 some	 contexts	 one	 might	 not	 meet	 the	 required	
standard	for	understanding	while	in	other	contexts	the	epistemic	bar	might	be	lower.	In	any	
case,	 settling	 this	 question	 about	 the	 truth	 conditions	 of	 understanding	 attributions	 is	 not	
essential	for	my	purposes	because	ascriptions	of	understanding	will	likely	serve	their	function	
regardless	 of	 whether	 invariantism	 or	 contextualism	 is	 true.	 At	 the	 very	 least,	 there	 is	 no	
obvious	 reason	 to	 think	 one	 of	 these	 two	 views	 about	 the	 semantics	 of	 understanding	
attributions	is	incompatible	with	my	hypothesis	about	their	function.			
	
5.	Do	Understanding	and	Explanation	Come	Apart?		
A	function-first	epistemologist	aims	to	construct	a	concept	that	not	only	functions	in	the	
manner	suggested	by	his	or	her	hypothesis,	but	also	one	that	fits	our	intuitions.	To	this	end,	
we	 must	 examine	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 my	 hypothesis	 matches	 the	 everyday	 concept	 of	
understanding.	This	is	the	third	step	in	our	three-part	approach	(outlined	in	section	2).	
There	are	two	ways	to	drive	a	wedge	between	explanation	and	understanding.	The	first	
is	 to	 show	 there	 are	 cases	 in	which	 a	person	 can	explain	why	p	
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understand	 why	 p.	 The	 second,	 which	 I	 briefly	 discussed	 above,	 is	 to	 argue	 that	 an	 agent	
might	have	genuine	understanding	and	yet	be	unable	to	provide	an	explanation.	Building	on	
the	modified	 hypothesis	 from	 the	 previous	 section,	 I’ll	 now	deal	with	 additional	 objections	
along	 these	 lines.	 I	 argue	 that	 my	 hypothesis	 does	 issue	 in	 conditions	 of	 application	 that	
match	the	intuitive	extension	of	the	word	‘understands’.		
The	 most	 obvious	 case	 in	 which	 a	 person	 can	 provide	 an	 explanation	 without	 having	
understanding	is	that	of	a	parroter.	A	parroter	is	someone	who	mindlessly	repeats	what	he	or	
she	has	heard.	 Imagine	a	presidential	 candidate	who	knows	 little	about	climate	change	but	
who	memorizes	the	following	explanation	of	the	phenomenon	for	his	stump	speech:		
	
Our	 climate	 is	 undergoing	 dramatic	 changes	 as	 a	 result	 of	 human	 activity.	 Although	
greenhouse	gases	like	carbon	dioxide	play	an	important	role	in	keeping	the	earth	warm,	
human	activities	like	the	burning	of	fossil	fuels	have	produced	too	much	carbon	dioxide.	
We	 need	 to	 reduce	 the	 emission	 of	 greenhouse	 gases	 in	 order	 to	 limit	 anthropogenic	
climate	change.21		
	
The	candidate	might	understand	some	aspects	of	this	description,	but	let’s	suppose	he	does	
not	understand	what	greenhouse	gases	are,	how	they	relate	to	climate	change,	or	what	role	
carbon	dioxide	plays	in	heating	the	earth.	Nevertheless,	the	candidate	seems	to	successfully	
provide	an	explanation	of	climate	change.		
It	 is,	 however,	 compatible	 with	 my	 hypothesis	 that	 people	 can	 provide	 explanations	
without	themselves	understanding.	As	you’ll	recall,	I	argue	that	ascriptions	of	understanding	
pick	out	good	explainers.	The	notion	of	a	‘good	explainer’	can	be	filled	out	in	multiple	ways,	
but	 one	 highly	 plausible	 characteristic	 of	 such	 a	 person	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 reliably	 evaluate	
explanations.	 Following	 Khalifa	 (2013),	 we	 may	 characterize	 a	 good	 explainer	 as	 someone	
who	 can	 typically	 discriminate	 between	 correct	 and	 incorrect	 explanations,	 and	 thus	 is	 not	
susceptible	 to	 believing	 incorrect	 explanations.	 Further,	 a	 good	 explainer	 can	 normally	
provide	 elaboration,	 answer	 closely	 related	 questions,	 give	 explanations	 in	 his	 or	 her	 own	
                                                
21	I’m	aware	that	I	would	make	a	horrible	political	speechwriter.			
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words,	 follow	 an	 explanation	 of	 why	 p	 given	 by	 someone	 else,	 and	 will	 often	 be	 able	 to	
answer	 “what	 if	 things	 had	 been	 different”	 questions.22	The	 parroter,	 in	 contrast,	 will	 lack	
these	 abilities	 and	 will	 therefore	 not	 qualify	 as	 an	 understander.	 This	 also	 illustrates	 that	
knowing	a	good	explanation	does	not	suffice	for	being	a	good	explainer,	since	it	is	plausible	to	
say	the	candidate	knows	a	good	explanation	(via	testimony)	and	yet	he	does	not	qualify	as	a	
good	explainer.		
Another	potential	gap	between	explanation	and	understanding	is	the	possibility	of	non-
explanatory	understanding.	You	might	think	it	is	possible	that,	for	all	correct	explanations	E	of	
p,	a	person	might	not	know	that	E	explains	p	and	yet	still	understand	p.	But	is	understanding	
without	explanation	possible?		
In	“Understanding	without	Explanation”,	Lipton	(2009)	rejects	the	idea	that	wherever	we	
find	 understanding	 we	 also	 find	 explanation.	 He	 defends	 the	 thesis	 that	 understanding	
without	 explanation	 is	 possible	 by	 appealing	 to	 several	 examples,	 one	 of	 which	 is	 the	
following:		
	
Suppose	that	a	boxing	match	between	Able	and	Baker	is	rigged	so	that	Baker—though	
in	fact	the	far	better	boxer—would	take	a	dive	 in	the	tenth	round.	 Imagine,	however,	
that	 as	 a	matter	 of	 fact	 Able	 floors	 Baker	 with	 a	 lucky	 uppercut	 in	 the	 fifth.	 (Lipton	
2009:	51)	
	
Lipton	 uses	 this	 example	 to	 argue	 that	 potential	 explanations	 may	 provide	 understanding	
without	 approximating	 an	 actual	 explanation;	 thus,	 understanding	 needn’t	 pass	 through	
actual	explanation.	But	how	plausible	 is	 Lipton’s	boxing	example?	Suppose	we	know	 that	 if	
the	fight	had	lasted	until	the	tenth	round,	then	Baker	would	have	taken	the	dive;	but	we	do	
not	know	that	Able’s	fifth	round	knockout	actually	caused	his	victory.	Do	we	understand	why	
Baker	lost	the	match?		
According	to	Lipton,	knowing	that	 the	match	was	rigged	helps	us	understand	why	Able	
won,	 even	 though	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 win	 depends	 entirely	 on	 the	 lucky	 punch.	 It	 is	
                                                
22	See	Woodward	(2003),	Grimm	(2012),	and	Hills	(2016).	More	abilities	might	be	needed,	such	as	those	
required	for	what	Hills	calls	‘cognitive	control.’	
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because	we	possess	knowledge	of	salient	counterfactual	scenarios	that	we	understand,	even	
though	we	do	not	know	the	actual	explanation.	Khalifa	agrees	with	Lipton	that	this	is	a	case	
of	understanding,	although	he	says	we	do	not	understand	why	Able	won	as	well	as	someone	
who	knows	about	the	actual	course	of	events	(2012:	12).		
I	 find	these	 judgments	surprising.	 It	seems	intuitive	to	me	that	we	would	only	think	we	
understand	 why	 Able	 won,	 but	 we	 would	 not	 actually	 understand	 why.	 Imagine	 someone	
who	 is	 surprised	 by	 Abel’s	 victory	 asks	 us:	 “How	 did	 Baker	 lose	 to	 Abel?”	 If	 our	 answer	 is	
“Because	Baker	took	a	dive”,	then	we	clearly	do	not	understand	why	Baker	lost	the	match.	If	
we	do	not	know	that	Able’s	fifth	round	knockout	was	actually	due	to	a	lucky	uppercut,	then	
we	 have	 an	 incorrect	 explanation	 for	 the	 match’s	 result	 and,	 consequently,	 we	 fail	 to	
understand	 why	 Baker	 lost.23	Thus,	 Lipton’s	 example	 does	 not	 illustrate	 the	 possibility	 of	
understanding	 without	 explanation.	 Rather,	 it	 seems	 consistent	 with	 the	 hypothesis	 that	
understanding	requires	a	good	explanation.			
Lipton	 also	 says	 we	 can	 acquire	 understanding	 through	 demonstrations	 rather	 than	
explanations.	In	a	bit	of	autobiography,	Lipton	writes:		
	
I	never	properly	understood	the	why	of	retrograde	motion	until	I	saw	it	demonstrated	
visually	 in	a	planetarium.	A	physical	model	such	as	an	orrery	may	do	similar	cognitive	
work.	 These	 visual	 devices	 may	 convey	 causal	 information	 without	 recourse	 to	 an	
explanation.	 And	 people	 who	 gain	 understanding	 in	 this	 way	 may	 not	 be	 left	 in	 a	
position	 to	 formulate	 an	 explanation	 that	 captures	 the	 same	 information.	 Yet	 their	
understanding	is	real.	(2009:	45)	
	
This	 passage	 expresses	 two	 important	 ideas:	 first,	 understanding	 can	be	 attained	 in	 a	 non-
explanatory	way	(i.e.,	via	demonstration);	second,	understanding	can	be	non-linguistic.		
The	 first	 point	 is	 perfectly	 compatible	 with	 my	 hypothesis.	 I	 claim	 that	 ascriptions	 of	
understanding	are	used	to	pick	out	good	explainers,	but	I	do	not	argue	that	demonstrations	
cannot	 put	 one	 in	 such	 a	 position.	 In	 fact,	 it	 seems	 highly	 plausible	 that	 a	 visual	
                                                
23	Strevens	(2013:	514)	agrees.		
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demonstration	of	the	sort	Lipton	describes	might	put	an	individual	in	a	position	to	provide	a	
good	explanation.	Thus,	I	grant	that	understanding	might	be	attained	through	demonstration	
(or	some	other	non-explanatory	route).		
Lipton’s	 second	 point	 is	 that	 understanding	 can	 be	 non-linguistic.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	 section,	 this	 objection	 is	 not	 persuasive.	 An	 agent	 (like	 Barney,	who	 saw	 the	milk	
spill)	might	lack	the	ability	to	formulate	an	explanation	for	others	and	yet	be	able	to	explain	
the	 event	 to	 himself.	 An	 individual’s	 inability	 to	 communicate	 an	 explanation	 does	 not	
necessarily	imply	that	the	person	is	not	a	good	explainer.	Further,	any	agent	who	is	unable	to	
formulate	a	self-explanation	does	seem	to	lack	understanding.	In	Lipton’s	case,	the	reason	the	
outer	planets	occasionally	seem	to	reverse	their	motions	is	that	the	earth’s	orbit	around	the	
sun	 is	 tighter	 than	 the	outer	planets,	 so	 it	will	occasionally	overtake	 them,	 thereby	causing	
the	appearance	of	retrograde	motion.	Anyone	who	cannot	formulate	this	idea,	even	roughly,	
has	not	understood	why	the	phenomenon	occurs.	Thus,	it	seems	impossible	for	someone	to	
understand	why	p	unless	she	can	formulate	an	explanation	as	to	why	p.		
A	consequence	of	this	view	is	that	we	probably	understand	less	than	we	think	we	do.	I	find	
this	 perfectly	 acceptable.	 After	 all,	 our	 phenomenological	 sense	 of	 understanding	 is	 an	
unreliable	 indicator	of	genuine	understanding	 (see	Trout	2002).	 It	 is	not	 counterintuitive	 to	
say	that	people	often	think	they	understand	something	that	they	do	not	actually	understand.	
Rather,	my	account	would	 simply	 reveal	 that	people	 sometimes	claim	 to	understand	 things	
that,	 if	 pressed	 for	 an	 explanation,	 they	 turn	 out	 not	 to	 understand.	 This	 phenomenon	 is	
known	 as	 ‘the	 illusion	 of	 explanatory	 depth’	 and	 it	 is	 well	 documented	 in	 psychology	 (see	
Rozenblit	and	Keil	2002).	
Lipton	provides	other	putative	examples	of	understanding	without	explanation,	although	
I	do	not	have	space	to	discuss	them	all	here.24	Many	of	them	can	be	set	aside	as	examples	of	
practical	 understanding	 or	 objectual	 understanding,	 not	 understanding-why.	 As	mentioned	
earlier,	an	explanationist	conception	of	understanding	is	probably	too	narrow	to	account	for	
the	full	range	of	cases	in	which	we	attribute	understanding.	But	this	cuts	no	ice	with	my	view	
because	I	am	analyzing	understanding-why.	
                                                
24	See	Khalifa	(2012)	and	Strevens	(2013)	for	additional	criticisms	of	Lipton’s	examples.		
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In	lieu	of	an	exhaustive	critical	discussion	of	each	of	Lipton’s	examples	(and	many	other	
possible	examples),	 let’s	suppose	for	the	sake	of	argument	there	are	some	genuine	cases	of	
understanding-why	without	explanation.	Would	this	put	my	view	in	peril?			
Not	necessarily.	Even	if	there	were	instances	of	understanding-why	without	explanation,	
these	 situations	 are	 presumably	 quite	 rare	 (I	 haven’t	 come	 across	 any	 such	 cases).	 This	 is	
consistent	 with	my	 claim	 that	 the	 primary	 function	 of	 attributing	 understanding-why	 is	 to	
identify	good	explainers.25	As	a	function-first	epistemologist,	the	goal	of	my	inquiry	is	not	to	
enumerate	 the	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 understanding,	 but	 rather	 to	
investigate	the	nature	and	origins	of	our	present	practice.	I	am	interested	in	identifying	what	
might	be	called	the	 ‘core’	of	the	concept	of	understanding-why,	which	allows	me	to	specify	
conditions	that	hold	only	for	the	most	part,	but	not	always.		
An	 advantage	of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	we	need	not	 ignore	 important	 characteristics	 of	
understanding.	A	theory	proposing	necessary	and/or	sufficient	conditions	will	be	rejected	in	
the	 face	of	any	counterexample,	 since	counterexamples	have	enormous	power	against	 that	
sort	of	approach.	If,	for	example,	it	can	be	argued	that	a	case	of	knowledge	without	belief	is	
possible,	 then	 belief	 will	 make	 no	 appearance	 on	 the	 final	 balance	 sheet	 in	 our	 theory	 of	
knowledge.26	Similarly,	 if	 a	 case	 of	 understanding	 without	 explanation	 were	 possible,	 then	
explanation	 would	 not	 be	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 understanding.	 Must	 we	 therefore	
abandon	our	theory	in	the	face	of	such	‘counterexamples’?	I	suggest	not.	Instead,	we	should	
be	open	 to	 the	possibility	 that	 explaining	 the	nature	 and	 value	of	 understanding	will	 come	
from	 certain	 contingent	 characteristics.	 Even	 if	 there	 are	 some	 cases	 of	 understanding	
                                                
25	We	can	use	things,	including	words	and	concepts,	for	many	purposes.	But	it	is	important	to	distinguish	
what	the	primary	function	of	something	is	as	opposed	to	what	it	may	function	as.	A	hammer,	for	example,	
can	be	used	as	a	paperweight	or	a	weapon	even	though	the	point	of	a	hammer	is	to	drive	nails	into	objects.	
Tools	can	always	be	used	for	diverse	purposes	once	we	have	them.	This	explanation	is	not	weakened	or	
undermined	by	the	fact	that	a	hammer	can	be	used	in	many	ways,	or	for	diverse	ends.	The	relevant	point	is	
that	hammers	likely	wouldn’t	be	able	to	serve	these	other	purposes	if	they	did	not	function	as	a	means	to	
drive	nails	into	objects.	Likewise,	the	concept	of	understanding	exists	because	it	helps	us	satisfy	certain	
some	basic	human	needs;	in	particular,	the	point	of	the	concept	of	understanding	is	to	identify	good	
explainers.	Once	this	concept	enters	our	conceptual	repertoire	we	may	use	it	in	diverse	ways.	But	it	is	
doubtful	that	it	would	serve	any	of	these	other	purposes	if	it	did	not	satisfy	its	primary	function.	When	I	
speak	of	the	primary	function	of	the	concept	of	understanding,	it	is	this	sense	of	function	that	I	have	in	
mind.	
26	See	Craig	(1990:	14)	for	a	similar	point.		
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without	 explanation,	 the	 possibility	 remains	 that	 explanation	 is	 something	we	 value	 about	
understanding.	 In	 contrast	 to	 traditional	 conceptual	 analysis,	 my	 approach	 permits	 us	 to	
include	 characteristics	 that,	 while	 not	 necessary,	 are	 important	 to	 understanding	 and	
important	to	us.27	
	
6.	The	Social	Roles	of	Knowing	and	Understanding		
It	 is	useful	 for	humans	 to	have	a	 range	of	predicates	 that	 serve	 to	express	a	variety	of	
evaluations	 of	 the	 epistemic	 position	 of	 other	 people.	 As	 I	 have	 been	 arguing,	 one	 useful	
predicate	has	to	do	with	identifying	good	explainers	because	humans	are	natural	explanation	
seekers	 and	 also	 cognitively	 dependent	 on	 others.	 Another	 useful	 predicate,	 such	 as	
‘rational’,	 might	 be	 used	 to	 influence	 our	 audience	 to	 follow	 the	 endorsed	 belief-forming	
rules. 28 	A	 third	 predicate,	 namely	 ‘knows’,	 presumably	 serves	 some	 other	 function	 (or	
functions).	 But	 what	 function(s)	 does	 it	 serve	 and	 how	 does	 it	 (they)	 differ	 from	
understanding?		
Several	theorists	have	argued	that	one	of	the	primary	functions	of	knowledge	ascriptions	
is	 to	 signal	 the	 point	 of	 legitimate	 inquiry	 closure	 (Kvanvig	 2009,	 Kappel	 2010,	 and	 Rysiew	
2012).	As	 inquirers,	humans	seek	reliable	 information	for	a	diverse	range	of	 theoretical	and	
practical	purposes.	But	the	process	of	 inquiry	 is	potentially	open-ended	because	 it	 is	always	
possible	to	seek	further	evidence.	Spending	all	our	time	and	resources	to	continue	inquiring	
would	be	impractical,	however,	since	further	inquiry	is	not	always	worth	the	reduced	risk	of	
being	wrong.	We	therefore	need	a	point	at	which	people	may	reasonably	terminate	inquiry.	
How	 do	 we	 signal	 when	 inquiry	 has	 gone	 on	 long	 enough?	 Many	 argue	 that	 knowledge	
attributions	certify	information	as	being	such	that	it	may,	or	even	should,	be	taken	as	settled	
for	the	purposes	of	one’s	deliberations.		
Pritchard	 denies	 that	 inquiry	 reasonably	 ends	 at	 knowledge.	 He	 argues	 that	 inquiry	
reasonably	terminates	at	understanding:				
	
                                                
27	Jones	(1997)	makes	this	point	with	respect	to	Craig’s	theory	of	knowledge.		
28	Dogramaci	(2012)	defends	this	idea.		
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Now	 ask	 yourself	 whether	 inquiry	 that	 resulted	 in	 knowledge	 but	 not	 in	 the	
corresponding	understanding	would	be	deemed	a	successful	inquiry	(and	thus	a	‘closed’	
inquiry,	 at	 least	 as	 regards	 the	 original	 question	 under	 investigation).	 I	 suggest	 not.	
(Pritchard	2010:	85)		
	
To	support	his	thesis,	Pritchard	considers	a	case	in	which	someone	finds	his	house	has	burned	
down	and	is	led	to	wonder	what	caused	the	fire.	Pritchard	argues	that	this	inquiry	will	not	be	
properly	closed	until	that	person	comes	to	understand	why	his	house	burned	down.		
While	 I	 agree	 with	 Pritchard	 about	 this	 example,	 his	 case	 does	 not	 illustrate	 that	
understanding	 is	 the	 aim	 of	 inquiry.	 That	 view	 is	 too	 strong	 to	 be	 plausible.	Why	 think	 all	
inquiries	 must	 have	 the	 same	 aim?	While	 some	 inquiries	 might	 demand	 understanding	 in	
order	 to	 be	 legitimately	 closed,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 all	 do.	Upon	 visiting	 the	 computer	 repair	
shop,	I	am	satisfied	with	knowing	that	my	laptop	works	without	needing	to	understand	why	
or	 how	 it	 works.	 This	 inquiry	 would	 successfully	 end	 at	 knowledge	 because	 I	 am	 not	
interested	 in	 the	underlying	explanations.	The	 reason	why	 inquiry	aims	at	understanding	 in	
Pritchard’s	example	is	grounded	in	the	fact	that	the	agent	seeks	an	explanation	for	the	event.	
But,	 as	 Kelp	 (2014)	 argues,	 our	 curiosity	 is	 very	 often	 directed	 at	 non-explanatory	
information.	 Suppose	 I	 am	 looking	 for	my	 car	 keys.	 In	 this	 situation,	 I	might	want	 to	 know	
whether	 my	 wife	 has	 them	 or	 not;	 but	 it	 is	 of	 no	 interest	 to	 me	 that	 my	 wife	 has	 them	
because	she	needed	to	get	something	out	of	the	car	and	she	forgot	to	put	the	keys	back	on	
the	 table.	 My	 inquiry	 would	 reach	 its	 goal	 and	 properly	 end	 even	 if	 I	 did	 not	 attain	 an	
understanding	of	why	the	relevant	proposition	is	true.	Thus,	while	understanding	sometimes	
legitimately	closes	inquiry,	mere	knowledge	will	often	suffice.29		
In	 fact,	 knowledge	 is	 probably	 more	 centrally	 linked	 to	 inquiry	 closure	 than	
understanding.	 Acquiring	 a	 deep	 understanding	 of	 the	 world	 might	 be	 worthwhile	 from	 a	
purely	 epistemic	 point	 of	 view,	 but	 such	 rarified	 concerns	 have	 little	 to	 do	 with	 the	 vast	
                                                
29	In	more	recent	work,	Pritchard	seems	to	grant	this	point	(2016:	34).	However,	he	argues	that	our	
inquiries	ought	not	to	be	sated	by	mere	knowledge	of	the	answer	to	one’s	question.	An	agent	who	is	
generally	willing	to	regard	inquiries	as	legitimately	closed	even	though	the	relevant	understanding	has	not	
been	attained	lacks	intellectual	virtue,	according	to	Pritchard.	I	think	this	is	also	too	strong.		
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majority	 of	 our	 everyday	 inquiries.	 When	 I	 need	 to	 find	 my	 way	 to	 Yankee	 Stadium,	 my	
judgment	about	whether	a	random	passerby	knows	its	location	has	little	to	do	with	a	concern	
for	understanding.	I	do	not	require	my	informant’s	belief	to	attain	a	high	level	of	explanatory	
depth;	all	 I	need	is	to	acquire	a	true	belief	from	a	reliable	source	of	 information.	What	I	am	
looking	 for	 is	a	 reliable	 informant	 about	 the	 truth	of	whether	p,	not	a	good	explainer	 as	 to	
why	p.	Ascriptions	of	knowledge	and	ascriptions	of	understanding	often	come	apart	because	
‘knows’	 typically	 picks	 out	 reliable	 informants	 whereas	 ‘understands’	 identifies	 good	
explainers—or	so	I	claim.	Since	our	ordinary	inquiries	are	often	satisfied	by	identifying	reliable	
informants	as	 to	whether	p	 (without	necessarily	acquiring	a	good	explanation	as	 to	why	p),	
inquiry	 will	 often	 end	 at	 knowledge.	 It	 might	 be	 true	 that	 if	 we	 could	 set	 aside	 various	
practical	 considerations,	 then	 we	 would	 aim	 for	 understanding.	 But	 given	 our	 need	 for	
actionable	information,	our	epistemic	dependence	on	others,	and	the	fact	that	we	can	rarely	
afford	to	pay	the	higher	‘informational	costs’	needed	to	acquire	understanding,	it	is	likely	that	
everyday	 inquiry	 will	 usually	 terminate	 at	 knowledge.	 In	 this	 respect,	 ascriptions	 of	
knowledge	might	play	an	important	role	in	everyday	life	that	ascriptions	of	understanding	do	
not.	
Linguistic	data	seems	to	support	this	argument.	‘Know’	is	one	of	the	10	most	commonly	
used	verbs	 in	English	 (Davies	and	Gardner	2010),	 the	 first	cognitive	verb	that	children	 learn	
(Shatz	 et	 al.	 1983),	 and	 the	most	 prominently	 used	 term	 in	 epistemic	 assessment	 (Gerken	
2015).	It	has	also	been	argued	that	‘know’	is	unlike	almost	every	other	word	because	it	finds	a	
precise	 meaning	 equivalent	 in	 every	 human	 language	 (Goddard	 2010).	 In	 contrast,	
‘understands’	 is	used	 far	 less	 frequently,	 learned	 later	 in	 life,	and	 features	 less	often	 in	our	
practice	 of	 epistemic	 assessment.	 These	 facts	 suggest	 that	 knowledge-talk	 plays	 a	 more	
important	role	in	epistemic	evaluation	than	understanding-talk.30	
Knowledge-talk	also	seems	more	closely	tied	to	tracking	norms	of	assertion	and	practical	
reasoning	than	understanding-talk.	This	is	because	knowledge	ascriptions	(and	denials)	align	
                                                
30	As	Alison	Hills	(2016)	reports,	many	languages	draw	a	similar	distinction	between	knowledge	and	
understanding	(e.g.	French,	German,	Russian,	Hebrew,	Danish,	and	Irish).	This	gives	some	prima	facie	
support	to	the	idea	that	knowing	and	understanding	play	distinct	social	roles.	Presumably,	we	wouldn’t	find	
this	distinction	in	many	languages	if	knowledge	and	understanding	were	simply	interchangeable	or	referred	
to	the	same	epistemic	concept.	
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with	natural	assessments	of	assertion	and	practical	reasoning	in	ordinary	language.	Here’s	an	
example:	 it	 seems	 appropriate	 to	 challenge	 assertions	 by	 asking	 the	 asserter,	 ‘How	do	 you	
know	that?’	(Williamson	2000:	252;	Unger	1975:	250-65).	In	contrast,	we	are	far	less	inclined	
to	challenge	assertions	by	asking	about	understanding.	Similarly,	we	can	rightfully	criticize	a	
person’s	actions	or	reasoning	when	that	person	acted	without	knowledge;	for	instance,	‘You	
shouldn’t	have	gone	down	this	street,	since	you	didn’t	know	that	the	restaurant	was	there’	
(Hawthorne	 and	 Stanley	 2008:	 571).	 Again,	we	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 criticize	 action	 or	 practical	
reasoning	by	appealing	to	understanding.		
These	 knowledge	 norms	 are	 not	 uncontroversial;	 many	 counterexamples	 have	 been	
offered.31	But	even	if	knowledge	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	warranted	assertion	or	
practical	reasoning,	it	is	plausible	that	‘knowledge’	normally	picks	out	the	epistemic	standard	
for	assertion	and	practical	 reasoning,	as	Gerken	 (2015)	and	 I	 ([removed])	have	argued.	This	
explains	 why	 competent	 and	 rational	 speakers	 frequently	 use	 ‘knows’	 when	 evaluating	
assertions	 and	 practical	 reasoning	 (because	 knowledge	 is	 normally	 required)	 even	 though	
knowledge	 is	 not	 the	 relevant	 epistemic	 norm	 (because	 sometimes	 more,	 or	 less,	 than	
knowledge	is	needed).		
Thus,	 knowledge	 ascriptions	 seem	 to	 play	 valuable	 social	 roles	 that	 understanding	
attributions	 do	 not.	 Specifically,	 knowledge	 ascriptions	 serve	 the	 interrelated	 functions	 of	
identifying	 reliable	 informants,	 typically	 signaling	 the	 appropriate	 end	 of	 inquiry,	 and	
providing	 a	 threshold-marker	 that	 indicates	 that	 the	 epistemic	 standard	 that	 is	 usually	
necessary	and	sufficient	for	assertion	and	practical	reasoning	has	been	met.	The	same	cannot	
be	said	for	attributions	of	understanding.32		
Does	this	 imply	that	understanding	is	not	a	species	of	knowledge?	I	am	doubtful	that	 it	
does.	 Even	 if	 understanding-why	 were	 reducible	 to	 knowledge-why,	 a	 distinction	 between	
‘knowing’	and	‘understanding’	might	be	drawn	because	the	latter	picks	out	a	special	kind	of	
knowledge.	 The	 point	 I	 am	 emphasizing	 is	 not	 about	 the	 reductive	 relationship	 between	
knowledge	and	understanding	(I	 leave	that	matter	open),	but	rather	about	the	difference	in	
                                                
31	For	criticisms	of	the	knowledge	norms,	see	Douven	(2006),	Lackey	(2007),	Weiner	(2007),	Brown	(2008),	
Gerken	(2011),	Reed	(2010),	and	Smithies	(2012).	
32	Hills	(2016)	also	suggests	that	although	understanding	is	valuable,	knowledge	might	be	more	important.		
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focus	when	we	think	and	speak	 in	 terms	of	understanding	rather	 than	knowing.	Knowledge	
attributions	 often	 refer	 to	 knowledge-that,	 whereas	 the	 type	 of	 knowledge	 needed	 for	
understanding	 includes,	at	a	minimum,	knowledge	of	 the	explanation	as	 to	why	p,	knowing	
how	 to	 elaborate	 and	 explain	 things	 in	 one’s	 own	 words,	 and	 grasping	 explanatory	
connections.	It	is	having	this	type	of	knowledge	that	makes	one	a	good	explainer.	We	tend	to	
attribute	 understanding	 when	 an	 agent	 meets	 a	 sufficiently	 high	 standard	 of	 explanatory	
depth.	Meeting	this	standard	might	simply	require	more	knowledge	(of	causes,	their	relation,	
etc.),	 but	we	mark	 this	 achievement	with	 the	word	 ‘understands.’	 In	 this	way,	 ‘knowledge’	
and	 ‘understanding’	 could	play	different	 social	 roles	whether	 or	not	 the	 latter	 is	 ultimately	
reducible	to	the	former.	
		
7.	Conclusion	
I	make	 two	 proposals	 in	 this	 paper.	 First,	 I	 suggest	 that	we	 can	make	 headway	 in	 the	
epistemology	of	understanding	by	taking	a	function-first	approach.	Second,	I	hypothesize	that	
humans	 think	 and	 speak	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘understanding’	 because	 it	 allows	 us	 to	 certify	 good	
explainers,	which	 is	 an	 important	 dimension	 of	 epistemic	 evaluation.33	As	 cognitively	 inter-
dependent	 explanation-seekers,	we	 need	 a	way	 to	 identify	 informants	who	 can	 provide	 us	
with	good	explanations	for	both	practical	and	theoretical	purposes.		
This	hypothesis	throws	light	on	the	nature	and	importance	of	understanding,	the	role	of	
explanation	in	understanding,	and	the	relationship	between	understanding	and	knowledge.	I	
have	argued	that	understanding	and	knowledge	play	different	social	roles,	since	the	latter	is	
not	necessarily	geared	towards	an	explanation	of	why	such-and-such	is	the	case.		Examining	
these	two	cognitive	achievements	from	the	point	of	view	of	their	function	also	sheds	light	on	
epistemic	value.	Specifically,	we	see	that	understanding	is	valuable	and	yet	knowledge	might	
play	a	more	 important	role	 in	human	survival	and	flourishing.	Roughly,	knowledge	is	closely	
tied	 to	 answering	 our	 need	 for	 true	 beliefs	 whereas	 understanding	 answers	 our	 need	 for	
                                                
33	These	two	proposals	are	not	inseparable.	You	might	endorse	the	function-first	methodology	while	
rejecting	my	hypothesis	about	the	function	of	understanding	attributions;	or	you	might	reject	this	
methodological	approach	but	still	think	there	is	an	important	conceptual	connection	between	
understanding	and	identifying	good	explainers.	
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good	explanations.	Ordinary	inquiry	is	typically	aimed	at	true	beliefs,	which	is	why	knowledge	
matters,	but	sometimes	we	need	more	than	just	true	beliefs	to	get	by	in	the	world.	We	want	
to	 grasp	 a	 variety	 of	 connections;	 we	 want	 to	 anticipate	 what	 would	 have	 happened	 had	
things	 been	 different;	 we	 want	 to	 see	 how	 things	 ‘hang	 together’.	 Thus,	 understanding	 is	
deeply	 important	even	though	the	concerns	of	practical	 life	often	prevent	us	 from	reaching	
for	the	highest	epistemic	fruit.		
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